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I
n January 2000 the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) instituted the practice of
issuing a “balance of risks” statement along with
its policy decision at the close of each FOMC meet-
ing. The balance-of-risks statement was intended
to indicate the Committee’s assessment of the bal-
ance of risks for heightened inflation pressures or
economic weakness over the foreseeable future.
In announcing the procedural change, the FOMC
explicitly noted that “this time frame in the new
language is intended to cover an interval extending
beyond the next FOMC meeting,” suggesting that
the balance-of-risks statement should not be inter-
preted as an indicator of the Committee’s next
policy action.
Previously, the FOMC had included a statement
in its policy directive that appeared to pertain to
possible future policy actions and came to be known
as the “symmetry,” “tilt,” or “bias.” The directive was
said to be symmetric, or unbiased, if the directive
indicated that a tightening or easing of policy was
equally likely during the period between FOMC
meetings—the “intermeeting period.”
The purpose of this article is to review the
FOMC’s use of its balance-of-risks statement and
the market’s interpretation of it. Despite the FOMC’s
claim that the balance-of-risks statement is not
intended to signal any particular action at or before
the next FOMC meeting, market participants have
used the statement when assessing the likelihood
of a policy action at the next meeting.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FOMC
STATEMENTS
The practice of adopting a bias in the policy
directive began in 1983; however, until 1999, the
statement of the bias that the FOMC adopted at one
meeting was not made public until after the next
meeting. In May 1999, the FOMC changed its practice
and began announcing the symmetry of its policy
directive at the conclusion of each meeting. This
announcement attracted considerable attention.
While the FOMC had never offered a formal inter-
pretation of the symmetry clause of its policy direc-
tive, the market interpreted the bias in one direction
or another as an indication of the likelihood that
the FOMC would change the intended funds rate in
that direction.1 This interpretation was reasonable
given that the bias was stated in terms of the need
to change the degree of pressure in reserve markets,
i.e., the intended funds rate, during the intermeeting
period. Nevertheless, Thornton and Wheelock (2000)
found that the bias had essentially no predictive
content for changes in the funds rate target at or
before the next meeting. Specifically, they found that,
while any action taken was nearly always in the
direction of the bias at the previous meeting, they
could not reject the hypothesis that policy actions
taken were independent of the asymmetric language
adopted at the previous meeting. Consequently, the
evidence suggests that policymakers were no more
likely to change the intended funds rate when the
bias at the previous meeting was asymmetric.
Nevertheless, it appears that the FOMC was
concerned that immediate release of the bias was
giving rise to undue expectations of a policy action
at or before the next FOMC meeting. Consequently,
in announcing its new procedure on January 19,
2000, the FOMC emphasized that the balance-of-
risks statement was not intended to convey informa-
tion about future policy actions. Specifically, the
FOMC noted that, “previously, the Committee’s
directive and statement referred to the relative likeli-
hood of an increase or a decrease in the intended
federal funds rate, which may have intensified the
public focus on the chance of a subsequent adjust-
ment to the stance of policy, thereby increasing the
possibility of misperceptions about the odds and
timing of policy action.”2
By removing explicit reference to both the
intended federal funds rate and the intermeeting
period, the Committee hoped that the new language
would not be interpreted as indication of the likeli-
hood of a policy action at or before the next sched-
uled Committee meeting.
1 For a discussion of three possible interpretations of the “tilt,” see
Thornton and Wheelock (2000).
2 FOMC (January 19, 2000).
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BALANCE-OF-RISKS STATEMENT
The FOMC increased its target for the funds rate
three times in 2000. All of these changes occurred
at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings (February,
March, and May), and all were made when the
balance-of-risks statement adopted at the preceding
meeting indicated heightened inflation pressures.
The Committee’s target for the federal funds rate
was reduced eleven times during 2001, once at each
of the eight regularly scheduled FOMC meetings and
three times between scheduled meetings. Again, on
each of these occasions the Committee had indicated
at the preceding meeting that the risks were toward
economic weakness.
Consequently, all 14 of the target changes that
occurred in 2000 and 2001 were made after the
Committee had indicated that the balance of risks
were weighted in the direction consistent with the
next target rate change.
The FOMC and the Balance-of-Risks
Statement
To assess the market’s interpretation of the
balance-of-risks statement, we read press analyses
of the FOMC’s public statement following each meet-
ing and other analyses of monetary policy over the
period since the adoption of the new procedure.
The relevant sources and quotations are presented
in the appendix. It is clear from reading these
accounts that the balance-of-risks statement was
one of the pieces of information that market partici-
pants used to determine the likelihood of an action
at the next meeting.3For example, on May 17, 2000—
the day after the FOMC announced that it was
increasing its target for the intended federal funds
rate by 50 basis points, the largest change in the
funds rate target in over five years—the Los Angeles
Times reported that the FOMC “hinted that it may
do so again next month,” noting that the Fed’s hint
of further rate increases came “in the form of a
warning that inflation remains a serious risk.”4
Similar statements appeared in several other major
newspapers on that day.
This interpretation is not unexpected since the
“foreseeable future” language of the balance-of-risks
statement includes the period up to and including
the next regularly scheduled FOMC meeting. This
interpretation was likely exacerbated by the FOMC’s
use of the balance-of-risks statement, as well as
statements made by some members of the FOMC.
An example of this occurred in late 2000 and
early 2001, when the FOMC changed its balance-
of-risks statement for the first time and soon after
made an intermeeting move: For the first seven
FOMC meetings in 2000, the Committee indicated
that the balance of risks were “mainly toward con-
ditions that may generate heightened inflation
pressures in the foreseeable future.” At the eighth
meeting, on December 19, 2000, the FOMC reversed
the balance-of-risks statement, indicating that “it
believes that the risks are weighted mainly toward
conditions that may generate economic weakness
in the foreseeable future.” Despite this dramatic
swing from unbalanced risks in one direction to
unbalanced risks in the other, the Committee chose
not to change the intended federal funds rate at
that meeting, leaving it at 6.5 percent. About two
weeks later, on January 3, 2001, the FOMC reduced
the funds rate objective by 50 basis points in an
intermeeting move.
Whether intended or not, these actions may
have conditioned market participants to believe that
the balance-of-risks statement was a good indicator
of the FOMC’s next policy action. Indeed, the minutes
of the December 19, 2000, FOMC meeting indicate
that some Committee members thought that the
shift in the balance-of-risks statement would have
this effect. The minutes note that “the revised state-
ment of risks, even though it would not be associated
with an easing move, could strengthen expectations
regarding future monetary policy easing to an extent
that was difficult to predict and could generate
sizable reactions in financial markets.”5
In any event, press reports show that the 180-
degree swing in the balance-of-risks statement was
widely interpreted as a signal that the Fed would
reduce rates at the next FOMC meeting in late
January. More than a year later, in reporting on the
events surrounding the December 19, 2000, FOMC
meeting, the Financial Times noted that at least one
member was thinking of the action as a signaling
device for policy actions, noting that, “as one FOMC
member says, policy has become as much about
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3 In 1994 the FOMC began the practice of adjusting its funds rate target
primarily at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. Consequently, most
expectations were for changes at a regularly scheduled meeting and
not during the intermeeting period. Indeed, the evidence here and in
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) shows that the markets were
surprised by intermeeting moves.
4 Mulligan (2000).
5 FOMC (2001, p. 229).
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diate rate changes.” The article goes on to say that
“Mr. Moskow, of the Chicago Fed, a keen bridge
player, describes the change in tilt as a ‘jump shift,’
a signal of a powerful hand.”6
The idea that the Committee viewed the shift in
the balance-of-risks statement as a signal of likely
future policy actions is borne out in other ways. For
example, there was a little-noticed sentence in the
December 19, 2000, press release, stating that
“the Committee will continue to monitor closely
the evolving economic situation.” The Financial
Times later noted that this “was a piece of classic
Fedspeak—an apparently anodyne and rather
obvious observation that the Fed was on heightened
alert, and would not necessarily wait six weeks until
the next scheduled meeting to cut interest rates.” The
article goes on to quote President Santomero of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia: “We indicated
that the situation was sufficiently fluid that we were
paying special attention to new information that
was coming up on a week to week basis.”
That the FOMC was poised to move ahead of
the January 30/31, 2001, meeting is also reflected
in the minutes of the December 19, 2000, meeting
which stated that, “on balance, the information
already in hand indicated that the expansion clearly
was weakening and by more than had been antici-
pated. In the circumstances, prompt and forceful
policy action sooner and larger than expected by
financial markets seemed called for.”
The view that the Fed would eventually have to
reduce the funds rate target was widely held. Indeed,
by mid-December 2000, the federal funds futures
market was already pricing-in a significant probabil-
ity of a 50-basis-point decline in the funds rate in
late January 2001; within a few days of the December
2000 meeting, the February 2001 federal funds rate
futures contract was essentially fully pricing-in a
50-basis-point reduction in the funds rate at the
January 30/31, 2001, meeting. The FOMC surprised
the market by reducing the funds rate by 50 basis
points on January 3, 2001. Moreover, it again adopted
a balance-of-risks statement indicating the prospects
for economic weakness. The futures market almost
immediately priced in another 50-basis-point cut
at the Fed’s regularly scheduled January 30/31 meet-
ing, dropping 29 basis points on January 3 and an-
other 19 basis points on January 4.7
Further evidence that some Committee members
interpreted the balance-of-risks statement as a sig-
nal of future policy actions came with the release
of the minutes of the May 15, 2001, FOMC meeting.
The minutes of that meeting report that “the mem-
bers anticipated that a neutral balance of risks state-
ment could be appropriate before long, probably
well before substantial evidence had emerged that
economic growth had strengthened appreciably,
once the Committee could see that policy had eased
enough to promote a future return to maximum
sustainable economic growth.” In reporting on
these minutes, John Berry of the Washington Post
noted that the end of the easing process “would be
marked by a statement from the committee that it
had decided that a ‘neutral balance of risks’ had
been achieved.”8
It is clear from press reports that during 2001
the balance-of-risks statement was an important
indicator of a likely Fed action. It is equally clear
that this interpretation was intensified by statements
of some members of the FOMC and by the FOMC’s
use of the balance-of-risks statement. A recent
example can be seen by contrasting the remarks
Chairman Greenspan made in a speech in San
Francisco on January 11, 2002, with his testimony
on the state of the economy given to the Senate
Budget Committee on January 24, 2002. In the San
Francisco speech, using phraseology similar to the
balance-of-risks statement, the Chairman said, “I
would emphasize that we continue to face significant
risks in the near term. Profits and investment remain
weak and, as I noted, household spending is subject
to restraint from the backup in interest rates, possible
increases in unemployment, and from the effects
of widespread equity asset price deflation over the
past two years.”9 His testimony before the Senate
Budget Committee was more upbeat. On January 25,
2002, the Wall Street Journal reported the following:
“In a rare admission of miscalculation for a man
considered the master market manipulator, the Fed
chairman told Congress that…by making a statement
in mid-January like ‘we continue to face significant
risks in the near term,’ Mr. Greenspan later realized
that he had unintentionally ‘implied that I didn’t
think the economy was in the process of turning.’”10
The Wall Street Journal noted further: “Just as Mr.
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7 See Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002, appendix) for details.
8 Berry (2001).
9 Greenspan (2002).
10 Schlesinger (2002).Greenspan’s mid-January speech led many analysts
to expect one more Fed interest rate cut later this
month,” based on a more balanced assessment of the
economic outlook, “yesterday’s remarks persuaded
many Fed watchers to revise their forecast for the
Jan. 29-30 monetary policy meeting.”11 Hence,
despite the fact that the risks were weighted toward
economic weakness, Greenspan’s comments
appeared to persuade market participants that no
additional easing was likely in late January.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BALANCE-
OF-RISKS STATEMENT FOR MARKET
EXPECTATIONS
While there is little doubt that the market con-
siders the balance-of-risk statement in determining
the likelihood of the next policy action, the impor-
tant question is how important is this information
for determining market expectations of a policy
move. One way is to see whether the balance-of-risks
statement helps the market to correctly anticipate
the FOMC’s actions. To do this, we use the measure
from Poole and Rasche (2000) of unexpected changes
in the intended federal funds rate. The Poole/Rasche
measure uses the change in the 1-month-ahead
federal funds futures rate on the day the target was
changed as their measure of the unexpected change
in the intended funds rate. For the first day of the
month, they use the difference between the rate on
the 1-month futures rate on the first day of the
month and the rate on the 2-month futures contract
on the last day of the previous month. (See Poole and
Rasche, 2000, and Poole, Rasche, and Thornton,
2002, for details.)
The Poole/Rasche measure of the unexpected
change is reported in Table 1 for each meeting and
for the three intermeeting changes during our sam-
ple period. Because of ambient variation in the fed-
eral funds futures rate, changes of 5 basis points or
less are considered insignificant. The Poole/Rasche
measure suggests that there were no instances during
2000 when there was an unexpected action by the
FOMC. During the first three meetings, the intended
funds rate was raised when the balance of risks were
weighted toward heightened inflation pressures. In
each of these cases, the market appears to have
anticipated the FOMC’s action.
The results for 2001 prior to September 11 were
very similar. Market participants were only surprised
when the FOMC made intermeeting changes in the
intended funds rate. On all of these occasions, how-
ever, market participants anticipated that the FOMC
would reduce the intended funds rate; they were
surprised only by the timing of the action. It appears
to be difficult to determine the precise day when
the FOMC will take an intermeeting action, even if
the market believes that such an action is likely.
There was a 7-basis-point change in the federal
funds futures rate on May 15, when the FOMC
reduced the intended funds rate by 50 basis points.
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) note, however,
that a more detailed analysis of news reports and
the futures rate shows that this change was in fact
anticipated. The other large change in the futures
rate occurred in the two months following the terror-
ist attacks on September 11. Figures 1 and 2 present
the daily rates on the November and December
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FOMC Events and a Measure of Unexpected
Policy Action




















1/30/02* 0.02  
NOTE: *Meeting, no change in the intended funds rate.
†Indicates an intermeeting target change.
Table 1
11 Schlesinger (2002).federal funds futures contracts around the dates of
the October and November FOMC meetings, respec-
tively. Vertical lines indicate the dates of these meet-
ings and the terrorist attack. Consistent with news
reports, these figures suggest that the cuts in the
intended federal funds rate were effectively antici-
pated by the time of the meeting. The unusually
large changes in the futures rates associated with
these meetings may be due in part to the greater
uncertainty in the wake of the terrorist attacks. This
uncertainty is particularly evident in the December
contract. 
Was the balance-of-risks statement definitive for
correctly forecasting policy actions? The answer is,
apparently not. Table 1 shows that the market cor-
rectly anticipated that the FOMC would not change
the intended funds rate at each of the last five FOMC
meetings during 2000 despite the fact that, on each
of these occasions, the balance-of-risks statements
were also weighted toward heightened inflation
pressures. Hence, while the press analyses suggest
that market participants look to the balance-of-risk
statement as one source of information, it is not the
only source. Indeed, it appears that it may not be a
critical source of information.
Market participants apparently also rely on their
understanding of how the FOMC will respond to the
latest economic reports and on statements of the
Chairman and other Fed officials. Perhaps the clear-
est example of the latter is shown by the behavior
of the rate on the February 2002 federal funds futures
contract. This contract is used because the January
2002 meeting was scheduled for January 29-30, so
the market’s expectations of FOMC actions at this
meeting are best reflected in the February contract.
The daily rate on this contract is plotted in
Figure 3. The four vertical lines denote the dates
of the December 2001 FOMC meeting, Chairman
Greenspan’s San Francisco speech, the Tuesday
following two press reports of a statement by a senior
Federal Reserve official clarifying the Chairman’s
San Francisco remarks, and the Chairman’s Senate
testimony. The behavior of the federal funds futures
rate suggests that there was considerable uncertainty
about the February 2002 federal funds rate before
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Figure 3the December 11, 2001, FOMC meeting. After that
meeting, when the FOMC indicated that the risks
remained balanced toward economic weakness,
expectations for the funds rate settled down and
the market priced-in a significant probability of a
25-basis-point reduction in the intended funds rate
at the January 2002 meeting.
Market expectations were significantly affected
by Chairman Greenspan’s remarks in San Francisco
on January 11, 2002, when the February federal
funds futures rate fell below 1.6 percent. Market
expectations were quickly revised, reducing the
probability of an additional cut in the intended
funds rate, and were revised further on Tuesday,
January 22, 2002, in the wake of two reports—one
in the Washington Post on Saturday, January 19,
and the other in the Wall Street Journal on Monday,
January 21—quoting an “unidentified Fed official”
as saying that the Chairman’s downbeat remarks
in San Francisco were overplayed and that a rate
cut was not all that likely. The probability of a cut
in the intended funds rate was all but eliminated
following the Chairman’s testimony before the
Senate Budget Committee on January 24, 2002.
Interpreting the Balance-of-Risks
Statement
While market participants appear to rely on a
wide range of information to determine the likeli-
hood of a policy action, it is interesting to note that,
on all 14 occasions when the funds rate was adjusted,
the balance-of-risks statement was unbalanced in
the direction of the rate change. Moreover, in all
but one of the cases where the balance-of-risks
statement was unbalanced toward economic weak-
ness, the FOMC decreased the policy rate. The excep-
tion occurred in January 2002, when the FOMC said
that the balance of risks was unbalanced toward
weakness, but took no action. In its public statement,
however, the FOMC noted that “signs that weakness
in demand is abating and economic activity is begin-
ning to firm have become more prevalent. With the
forces restraining the economy starting to diminish,
and with the long-term prospects for productivity
growth remaining favorable and monetary policy
accommodative, the outlook for economic recovery
has become more promising.” Hence, despite the
fact that risks were slanted toward economic weak-
ness, the FOMC made it clear that indications were
that the economy was strengthening.
We speculate that the fact that the FOMC has
nearly always reduced the funds rate objective when
the balance-of-risk statement was unbalanced toward
economic weakness is a natural consequence of
the statement itself. It is difficult to see why the
Committee would not act promptly in an attempt
to offset these risks to whatever extent possible
when policymakers believe that the risks are tilted
toward economic weakness. Indeed, in reacting to
the January 3, 2001, funds rate cut, former Governor
Wayne Angell echoed this sentiment, saying “I’ve
never seen the Fed get themselves into such a
dilemma as they were in Dec. 19, saying how bad
the economy was but also saying they weren’t acting
[then]. After that, they needed to cut rates, probably
within the first two weeks [of the year].”12 In retro-
spect, we now know that, properly interpreted, the
remainder of the statement made it clear that the
FOMC had no intention of waiting very long to reduce
the funds rate target.
One could argue that the same argument applies
to situations where the balance of risks is weighted
toward heightened inflation pressures. We believe
there are differences, however. For one thing, signs
of slowing in economic growth are typically readily
apparent—a rising unemployment rate, reductions
in production and/or sales, weakening consumer
and investor confidence, etc. Indicating that these
signs of a weakening economy are emerging and
threaten to worsen will naturally lead the public to
expect that policymakers will take actions to prevent
a downturn.
In contrast, signs that inflation may be worsen-
ing are more amorphous. Forward-looking inflation
indicators—the spread between inflation adjusted
and non-inflation adjusted Treasury rates, money
growth measures, inflation surveys, and commodities
futures prices—have not proven reliable predictors
of near-term inflation. Policymakers would be more
likely to act if the underlying trend in inflation were
rising; however, month-to-month inflation numbers
are quite volatile. It generally takes several months
to obtain conclusive evidence of a significant shift
in the underlying inflation rate. Consequently, mar-
ket participants might be less inclined to believe
that the FOMC will react quickly to a “bad” inflation
report.
Moreover, former Vice Chairman Blinder (1998,
pp. 19-20) has suggested that a central bank “will take
far more political heat when it tightens preemptively
to avoid higher inflation than when it eases preemp-
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12 Schlesinger, Ip, and Kulish (2001); see appendix.tively to avoid higher unemployment.” If true, then
the “political” costs of adjustment are higher for
raising the funds rate target than for lowering it.
Such asymmetric adjustment costs may generate
more inertia in “tightening” than in “easing” policy.
For these reasons, we believe that market par-
ticipants are less likely to interpret a statement that
the risks are weighted toward heightened inflation
pressures as an indicator of an impending FOMC
tightening than to interpret a statement that the
risks are weighted toward economic weakness as
an indicator of an impending FOMC easing.
CONCLUSION
The balance-of-risks statement is only one of
the factors that market participants consider in
forming their expectations of FOMC actions, and it
appears that this statement alone is not a critical
factor. An important source of information is the
“clarifying statement” that sometimes accompanies
the announcements made at the conclusion of FOMC
meetings, as well as general statements made by the
Chairman and other FOMC members. The impor-
tance of the accompanying statement was apparently
not appreciated initially. It appears that the FOMC’s
attempt to signal that it would likely take action
before its regularly scheduled FOMC meeting on
January 31, 2001, was too cryptic. Later, the impor-
tance of the statement was recognized. A similar
message sent in the statement following the January
2002 meeting was not misinterpreted. In spite of
the statement that the risks remained unbalanced
toward economic weakness, this FOMC statement
was widely interpreted to mean that no additional
easing actions were likely to occur in the absence
of significant new evidence.
We believe that at each meeting the FOMC policy-
makers set the policy instrument at the level that
they believe to be consistent with their policy objec-
tives given what they then know about the state of
the economy. Policymakers should be prepared to
act when new information suggests that their econ-
omic objectives cannot be obtained without adjust-
ing the policy instrument. Policymakers might do
well to indicate the kinds of information they believe
to be important in making these decisions. Over time,
the combination of (i) information about what policy-
makers believe to be important and (ii) their reaction
to economic reports will provide market participants
a better framework for anticipating policy actions—
an activity that is certain to continue regardless of
the FOMC’s disclosure policy.
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Appendix
PRESS ANALYSES OF THE FOMC’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOLLOWING EACH
FOMC MEETING: JANUARY 2000 THROUGH JANUARY 2002
02/03/2000
Stocks Mixed on Rate News; Treasury’s Plan Rallies Bonds; Wall St.: Dow off 37, Nasdaq up 22.
Fed increase is less than some investors expected, but markets face uncertainty over potential
for more hikes.
by Thomas S. Mulligan, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. C1
The Fed’s official statement Wednesday said the central bank believes the risks are “weighted mainly
toward conditions that may generate heightened inflation pressures in the foreseeable future.” Many
Wall Streeters believe that will mean at least two more quarter-point rate increases this year. Others, how-
ever, say rates may well be peaking now, assuming the economy slows and inflation remains subdued.
02/03/2000
WEDNESDAY’S MARKETS
Fed Decision Gets Mixed Reaction from Stocks—Treasury Move Stirs Bond Rally
by E.S. Browning, Wall Street Journal, p. C1
And while the Fed didn’t explicitly say that it will raise rates again, that is what investors concluded
from its comment that inflation remains the main threat to the economy.
02/03/2000
Fed Hikes Rates 0.25% Amid Concerns About Surging U.S. Economy
by Gerard Baker in Washington and Ed Crooks in London, Financial Times, USA Edition, p. 1
Amid concerns the robust U.S. economy could ignite inflation, the Federal Reserve on Wednesday
raised two short-term interest rates to their highest level in more than four years and indicated that
further tightening may be needed in the near future.
03/22/2000
TUESDAY’S MARKETS
Stocks and Bonds Shoot Higher Despite Rate Increase by the Fed
by Gregory Zuckerman, Wall Street Journal, p. C1
And despite investors’ satisfaction that interest-rate increases must surely be winding down, the Fed
hinted that more rate increases are likely this year.
03/22/2000
Fed Makes Expected Increase on Rates—Main Target Rises to 6%, More Action Promised;
Markets Seem Unfazed
by Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, p. A3
The Federal Reserve continued its slow but steady campaign to damp the economy with another small
increase in interest rates and declared more action was likely this spring.
03/22/2000
Fed Raises Rates as Inflation Hedge; Markets Anticipated Quarter-Point Rise
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. E2
Federal Reserve officials, concerned that the nation’s extraordinarily strong economic growth will
eventually lead to higher inflation, raised short-term interest rates by a quarter-percentage point yester-
day and indicated that more such moves are probable if growth doesn’t slow to a more sustainable pace. 
05/17/2000
Fed Raises Key Interest Rates; Policymakers Hint More Increases Will Follow Half-Point Boost
by John M. Berry, Washington Post , p. A1
The Federal Reserve raised its target for overnight interest rates by half a percentage point yesterday
to slow headlong U.S. economic growth and keep inflation from rising. A statement explaining the
action indicated that additional rate increases are likely in coming months. SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002      45
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05/17/2000
Fed Targets Inflation, Hikes Rate Half-Point; ECONOMY: Central bank hints at still more
tightening. Banks quickly raise their prime rates, meaning consumers will soon feel the pinch.
by Thomas S. Mulligan, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. A1
Escalating its campaign to preempt inflation, the Federal Reserve on Tuesday raised a benchmark interest
rate by one-half of a percentage point and hinted that there may be more credit tightening ahead.
05/17/2000
Investors Shrug Off Fed Rate Rise, Push Blue Chips Up 126.79 Points
by E.S. Browning, Wall Street Journal, p. C1
The Fed hint of further rate increases, in the form of a warning that inflation remains a serious risk,
came on top of its widely expected decision to raise its guideline short-term interest rates by half a
percentage point.
05/17/2000
Fed Boosts Rates by One-Half Point, Warns That the Economy Isn’t Slowing—Central Bank’s
Statement Indicates More Increases as Elections Approach
by Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, p. A2
Looking ahead to their next meeting scheduled for June 27 and 28, the Fed’s monetary policy committee
said in a statement that it still believes the economy’s “risks are weighted mainly toward conditions
that may generate heightened inflation pressures in the foreseeable future.” That means more rate
increases, possibly another half-point rise, are on the table, which could put Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan in the politically awkward position of continuing to raise borrowing costs as the November
elections approach. Futures markets designed to predict upcoming Fed moves were betting late yesterday
on a quarter-point move in June and then a half-point move by the November vote.
05/17/2000
Fed Tries To Rein in US Economy with Half Point Interest Rate Rise
by Gerard Baker, Financial Times, p. P1
In a statement, the FOMC attributed its decision to familiar concerns over growth in demand surpassing
the growth in supply and implied further increases may be necessary in the near future.
06/29/2000
Market Savvy Fed Votes To Put Off 7th Straight Rate Hike; ECONOMY: The central bank implied
it would raise interest rates in August unless it sees more signs of economic weakness.
by Thomas S. Mulligan, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. C1
Thus the central bank implied it would resume raising borrowing costs at its Aug. 22 meeting unless
it sees more definitive signs of economic weakness over the next two months.
06/29/2000
Fed Votes Not To Raise Interest Rates, for Now
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. E1
“Nonetheless, signs that growth in demand is moving to a sustainable pace are still tentative and prelimi-
nary” and the nation’s labor markets remain very tight, the committee said, adding that “the risks
continue to be weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate heightened inflation pressures
in the foreseeable future.” That was the Fed’s way of warning that inflation concerns could cause
policymakers to move rates higher in coming months.
08/23/2000
Fed Holds Rates Steady, Issues Inflation Warning; ECONOMY: Many economists expect no further
increases by the Federal Open Market Committee, which cited slowing growth in demand and
improved productivity in its decision.
by Peter G. Gosselin, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. C1
That murkiness was behind the Fed’s warning Tuesday that the economic “risks continue to be weighted
mainly toward conditions that may generate heightened inflation pressures in the foreseeable future.”46 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002
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The warning signaled that the central bank is maintaining its “tightening bias,” or tilting toward raising,
rather than lowering, rates if it takes any further action at all.
08/23/2000
Market Skips Party on Fed News, Settles for Slim Gains
by E.S. Browning, Wall Street Journal, p. C1
Not everyone was so hopeful. The Fed indicated in a statement after its policy meeting that it might
have to raise rates later to stave off inflation. “The risks,” it said, “continue to be weighted mainly toward
conditions that may generate heightened inflation pressures in the foreseeable future.”
11/10/2000
Analysts Predict Fed Will Leave Rates Alone
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. E1
Many analysts predict that the FOMC, the central bank’s top policymaking group, will keep that “bias”
in the statement it issues after its deliberations, and which many investors take as a hint at the Fed’s
possible future action. But some others believe economic growth has slowed enough that the FOMC
may be ready to drop that bias in favor of a “neutral” statement saying the risks are now balanced.
The issue is important because a shift to neutral probably would be taken by financial markets as a
signal that rate cuts could be in offing, perhaps as soon as early next year.
11/16/2000
Fed Puts Rates On Hold Again; But Inflation Is Still Viewed as a Risk
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. E1
Some investors had been hoping the Fed officials would decide that those risks are balanced, which
could be a first step toward reducing rates in coming months.
11/16/2000
Bond Prices Rally as Investors, Who See Chance of Future Cut, React to Fed’s Decision on Rates
by Gregory Zuckerman and Steven Vames, Wall Street Journal, p. C20
The Fed left the fed-funds rate, or its target Fed funds overnight interbank rate, at 6.5%, and also kept
in place its bias toward a “risk of heightened inflation pressures” and the higher interest rates that
would be needed to fight such pressures. The Fed’s decision was widely anticipated, but while some
investors were disappointed the Fed kept its so-called bias tilted in favor of further rate increases others
took heart by the wording in the Fed’s statement accompanying its announcements, figuring the
chances for a rate cut down the line had been raised.
12/20/2000
Fed Shifts to Worry Over Risk of Slump but Keeps Short-Term Rates Unchanged—Markets Now
Expect Cuts at the End of January as Inflation Fear Fades
by David Wessel and Gregory Zuckerman, Wall Street Journal, p. A2
The Federal Reserve promised to throw a life preserver to the U.S., declaring that the risks of “economic
weakness in the foreseeable future” exceed the risks of inflation. But it left short-term interest rates
unchanged. Financial markets now expect the Fed to begin cutting rates at the end of January, and to
reduce them at least one-half percentage point by spring.
12/20/2000
Fed Leans Toward a Future Rate Cut; Agency Says Economic Slowdown Poses Greater Threat
Than Inflation
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. E1
The officials left interest rates unchanged for now but said the risk that economic growth will slow
sharply is now greater than the risk that inflation will get worse. At their previous meeting, last month,
they noted that growth had slowed but said inflation still posed the greater risk. That 180-degree swing
in concern underscored the rapidity with which economists and Fed officials alike have been marking
down their expectations about the immediate course of the economy. And to some analysts it suggested
that the Fed officials could begin to cut rates as early as their next meeting, on Jan. 30-31.SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002      47
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12/20/2000
Treasury Prices Drop as Investors Absorb News of the Federal Reserve’s New Stance on Rates
by Michael S. Derby, Wall Street Journal, p. C21
The Fed left its target for the federal-funds, or overnight bank, lending rate, unchanged at 6.50%. But
its announcement of the decision suggested that the Fed is leaning toward lowering interest rates in
the near future. It said that although there remains some potential for inflation, the risks to the economy
now "are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable
future."
01/04/2001
Fed Unexpectedly Cuts Key Rate by Half-Point; ECONOMY: The central bank’s aggressive action
underscores concerns over a slowdown. Stock markets soar, with Nasdaq index posting a
record gain.
by Peter G. Gosselin, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. A1
As it customarily does, the Fed accompanied its rate reductions with an explanation. It said in a statement
that it had acted “in light of further weakening of sales and production, and in the context of lower
consumer confidence, tight conditions in some segments of financial markets and high energy prices
sapping household and business purchasing power.” And it left the door open for further cuts, saying
that the risks “are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness.”
01/04/2001
Fed Acts To Bolster Economy with an Unexpected Rate Cut; Wall Street Cheers Half-Point
Move; Nasdaq Index Gains a Record 14.2%
by Steven Pearlstein, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. A1
The Federal Reserve yesterday cut short-term interest rates by half a percentage point—a dramatic
move designed to bolster investor and consumer confidence and prevent the economy from slipping
into recession. The Fed also hinted that further cuts may be in the offing.
01/04/2001
Two-Edged Sword: Fed’s Surprise Move Sparks Market Rally, Sets Off New Jitters—Action
Reflects Rising Fear of Recession, Pressure On Central-Bank Policy—Boost for Bush’s Tax Cut?
by Jacob M. Schlesinger, Greg Ip, and Nicholas Kulish, Wall Street Journal, p. A1
By declaring that the “risks” in the economy remain “weighted mainly toward...economic weakness,”
the Fed also made clear it’s ready to do still more. Financial markets that bet on future Fed moves
were trading yesterday afternoon on the assumption of a quarter-point rate reduction at the central
bank’s two-day meeting on Jan. 30 and 31, and one more of the same size at the Fed’s March meeting.
03/21/2001
Fed Delivers Rate Cut with a Hint of More to Come; ECONOMY: The half-point trim is intended
to help revive growth, which has slowed to nearly zero. Analysts see the move as a refusal to
accommodate Wall Street.
by Peter G. Gosselin, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. A1
Among other things, officials promised to “monitor developments closely”—a code phrase that analysts
said meant the central bank could cut rates again before the next meeting of its policymaking Federal
Open Market Committee in mid-May.
03/21/2001
Economic Fix: As Fed Trims Rates, Other Forces Work To Dilute the Benefits—Consumer Debt,
Slow Exports and Corporate Jitters Damp Jump-Start Bid—Markets Lose More Ground
by Greg Ip and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, p. A1
The Federal Reserve’s move to lower short-term interest rates by half a percentage point brings rates
down a total of 1.5 percentage points this year. And officials made clear yesterday they are prepared
to do much more—possibly even before their next official rate-setting session May 15.48 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002
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03/21/2001
Fed Rate Cut Leaves Wall St. Unsatisfied
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. A1
The FOMC cautioned in a statement that weak conditions in the manufacturing sector, where production
has fallen and thousands of workers have been laid off, “could continue for some time.” Increasing
economic problems abroad, particularly in Japan, also pose “substantial risks” that could keep the
U.S. economy soft for some time to come, the committee said. Because of these developments, the
committee said, the risks the economy faces continue to be “weighted mainly toward conditions that
may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.” In other words, a solid recovery is not
yet assured and more rate cuts may be needed.
04/19/2001
Bonds Rise on Fed’s Surprise Interest-Rate Cut; Belief in More Trims Aids Short-Term Securities
by Gregory Zuckerman, Wall Street Journal, p. C16
Some bond traders seized on the wording of the Fed’s rate announcement, which focused on the
weakness of the U.S. economy and made it plain that the Fed is ready to keep cutting rates.
04/19/2001
Behind the Surprise: Half-Point Rate Cut Shows Balancing Act by Federal Reserve—Greenspan
Pegs His Moves to the Economy but Keeps Close Eye on the Markets—Nasdaq Bounds 8.1% Higher
by Greg Ip and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, p. A1
Many economists think the Fed still has more work to do, which the central bank doesn’t seem inclined
to dispute. Its statement expressed concerns of continued “risks” of “economic weakness.” The futures
market that bets on Fed action is pricing in a Fed funds rate as low as 4% by July.
05/16/2001
THE NATION: Fed Cuts Key Rate Half a Point to 4%
by Peter G. Gosselin, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. A1
The Federal Reserve cut its key interest rate another half percentage point to 4% on Tuesday and,
contrary to what had been expected, left the door open for still more cuts aimed at getting the stumbling
U.S. economy moving again.
05/16/2001
Fed Delivers Expected Rate Cut, but Investors’ Reaction Is Muted
by E.S. Browning, Wall Street Journal, p. C1
The Fed did give investors just about all they could have hoped for: another half-percentage-point cut
in its target for short-term interest rates and a hint that it will continue to reduce rates if the economy
remains weak.
05/16/2001
Fed Makes 5th Cut in Rates This Year; Action to Date Is Most Aggressive Since ‘82
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. A1
The wording of the Fed’s announcement gave no hint that the officials believe that economic growth
is picking up. To the contrary, it signaled that the Fed is likely to cut rates again, though probably not
before the next policymaking session in late June…The FOMC signaled in its statement that it will
consider additional rate cuts, concluding that the risks facing the economy “are weighted mainly
toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.” But the statement
omitted other language that has been used in recent months to prepare financial markets for a rate
cut during the period between policymaking sessions.
06/28/2001
THE NATION: Fed Trims Key Rate a Quarter Point
by Peter G. Gosselin, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. A1
The central bank’s Federal Open Market Committee coupled the cut with a statement signaling it is
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considerably less emphatic than in past months, suggesting uncertainty about how much more is
needed to spark a recovery.
06/28/2001
Fed Trims Interest Rates Again; Quarter-Point Reduction Disappoints Some Analysts
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. A1
Federal Reserve officials reduced their target for short-term interest rates by a quarter of a percentage
point yesterday, the sixth rate cut of the year, as part of the central bank’s effort to boost the country’s
anemic economic growth. They also left the door open to additional rate cuts by indicating in a state-
ment that they still believe the risks to the economy “are weighted mainly toward conditions that may
generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.”
06/28/2001
Financial Times
After five half-point interest rate cuts in five months, Wednesday’s quarter-point move might disappoint
some investors. But shifting to a quarter does not mean that the Fed’s work is done: the statement
maintains the bias towards cutting rates further.
06/29/2001
Fed Minutes Hint Cuts Are Nearly Over
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. E1
Wednesday’s statement said the FOMC still found that the risk of further economic weakness out-
weighed the risk of inflation. In other words, as of this week the committee believes further rate cuts
may be needed to stimulate the sluggish U.S. economy. But that does not necessarily mean there will
be additional cuts. That will depend on the policymakers’ assessment of the course of the economy
when they meet next, on Aug. 21.
08/22/2001
Financial Times
The latest quarter point cut was justified by the continued weakness of the economy. Recent glimmers
notwithstanding, the risks remain on the downside and the Fed maintains its policy bias to ease further.
08/22/2001
Recession Fears Prompt Fed To Cut Rates Again; ECONOMY: Panel trims benchmark a quarter
point and leaves door open for another reduction to counter continuing weakness.
by Warren Vieth, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. A1
The Federal Reserve cut interest rates Tuesday for the seventh time this year, warning that the economy
may continue to weaken and signaling its willingness to ease rates even more to ward off a recession.
08/22/2001
Fed Again Reduces Key Rate; Quarter-Point Cut May Not Be Last
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. A1
Federal Reserve officials, concerned about the uncertain outlook for the U.S. economy amid a global
slowdown in growth, lowered their target for short-term interest rates yesterday for a seventh time
this year and left the door open for more cuts if needed...The Fed policymakers made it clear they
are open to more cuts by saying that while “long-term prospects for productivity growth and the
economy remain favorable,” the committee believes “the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions
that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.”
08/22/2001
Fed Cuts Rates to Lowest Level Since ‘94—Quarter-Point Reduction Tied to Slump Overseas,
Weak Business Climate
by Greg Ip, Wall Street Journal, p. A2
The Fed also indicated it was more likely to lower than raise rates in the future, saying risks were
“weighted mainly toward...economic weakness” rather than inflation.50 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002
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09/18/2001
ASSAULT ON AMERICA; ECONOMY: Fed’s pre-emptive strike to shore up confidence
by Gerard Baker, Financial Times
But the central bank also went out of its way to ensure there was no doubt that it was prepared to do
much more to help out. Not only did it retain its policy “tilt”—the pro-forma statement that said the
Fed sees the risks weighted more towards economic weakness than towards inflationary pressures...The
maintenance of the “tilt” towards further easing was also strongly suggestive that interest rates are
set to go lower still at the next scheduled meeting of the open market committee on October 2.
10/03/2001
Fed Trims Rates Again, Hints at Further Cuts
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. A1
Federal Reserve policymakers, citing the damage caused by the recent terrorist attacks to the stalled
U.S. economy, yesterday cut short-term interest rates for the ninth time this year and signaled that
they may well reduce them again to help ease the coming financial pain...Fed officials also indicated
yesterday that they are likely to further trim the federal funds rate, the interest rates financial institu-
tions charge one another on overnight loans, perhaps as soon as their next meeting on Nov. 6. Even
though that rate is already a full 4 percentage points lower than it was at the beginning of the year,
the committee said “the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic
weakness in the foreseeable future.”
11/07/2001
Key Fed Rate Cut to 40-Year Low; ECONOMY: In real terms, the half-point trim to 2% pushes
the benchmark into negative territory.
by Peter G. Gosselin, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, p. A1
In what has become a familiar refrain, the central bank signaled it was ready to cut rates still further.
“The risks are [still] weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness,”
they said.
11/07/2001
Fed Lowers Rates for 10th Time This Year
by John M. Berry, Washington Post, Final Edition, p. A1
Federal Reserve officials, clearly worried that the U.S. economy may be spiraling downward into reces-
sion in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, yesterday cut short-term interest rates for the 10th
time this year and indicated they may trim them again if necessary...The FOMC also said that the risks
facing the economy “are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness,”
the members’ signal that they may cut rates again unless they see signs that the economy’s downward
momentum is slowing. Some analysts said such action is likely at the next FOMC meeting Dec. 11.
12/12/2001
With the Economy Still Fragile, the Fed Again Cuts Rates
by Richard W. Stevenson, New York Times, p. 1, col. 2
The statement went on to use the Fed’s code for a willingness to cut rates again, saying “the risks are
weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.”
12/12/2001
Fed Slices Interest Rates to 1.75%, Leaves Door Open for More Cuts
by Greg Ip, Wall Street Journal, p. A2
In a brief statement accompanying the move, policy makers said that “weakness in demand shows
signs of abating, but those signs are preliminary and tentative.” They said risks were still skewed to
more economic weakness, suggesting an inclination to lower rates rather than raise them or leave
them alone.